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This paper studies the impact of globalisation on wage inequality in eight now-developed countries
during the century prior to 1970, using the same dependent variable and methodology as research on
the impact of globalisation since 1970. The results suggest that the impact of globalisation was
confined largely to the effects of the pre-1914 mass migrations in the United States and Canada.
Powerful “domestic” forces, which included expanding home supplies of skilled labour, the growth of
new skill-intensive industries, and fluctuations in the level of aggregate demand, had a greater impact
on wage inequality for most of the period.
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51   INTRODUCTION
The recent impact of globalisation on inequality is a hotly debated issue (e.g. Wood, 1994, 1995;
Richardson, 1995; Robbins, 1996). The effects of globalisation on inequality before the recent period
have also been debated (e.g. O’Rourke et al., 1996; O’Rourke and Williamson, 1997; Taylor and
Williamson, 1997; Williamson, 1997). The “current” and “historical” debates have focused on both the
between-country and within-country dimensions of inequality, but they have examined different
aspects of inequality within countries. The current debate has focused on inequality between different
groups of workers, particularly between skilled and unskilled wages. The historical debate has focused
on other indicators of inequality, notably wage-rental and wage-productivity ratios.1 The aim of this
paper is to introduce wage inequality - the focus of the current debate - into the historical debate.2
More specifically, it investigates the impact of globalisation on the wages of skilled relative to
unskilled labour (hereafter referred to as the relative wages of skilled labour) during the century (1870-
1970) prior to the current period.
1.1   The Arguments
The evidence on wage-rental and wage-productivity ratios suggests that globalisation before the recent
period had a large impact on inequality within countries, for two main reasons. First, during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, international commodity market integration and mass
migration led to a process of relative factor-price convergence which saw the returns to labour
decrease relative to land and other factors in the land-abundant countries of the “New World”, and
increase in the labour-abundant countries of the “Old World” (O’Rourke et al., 1996; Williamson,
1997). Secondly, during the inter-war period, “de-globalisation”, characterised by rising trade barriers
and immigration quotas, led to a reversal of these patterns (Williamson, 1997).
Did these globalisation forces also have a large impact on wage inequality, and, if so, did they
reinforce or counteract the trends in wage-rental and wage-productivity ratios? To begin with, it is
likely that the mass migration of mainly unskilled workers during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries had a big impact on wage inequality, strongly reinforcing the trends in wage-rental
and wage-productivity ratios. The impact of international trade, on the other hand, is less certain. New
and Old World countries differed more in their relative endowments of land and labour than in their
relative endowments of skilled and unskilled labour, so that trade was less likely to have led to the
same process of relative factor-price convergence as with wage-rental ratios.3 Impacts on wage
inequality may still have been important, given that trade based on differences in skill endowments
may have taken place with countries outside the New and Old Worlds and that trade based on
differences in relative endowments of land and labour will affect wage inequality if primary
production requires relatively more unskilled labour than manufacturing, but seem as likely to have
offset the trends in wage-rental and wage-productivity ratios as to have reinforced them.
6This paper explores these potential impacts by estimating changes in the amounts of skilled and
unskilled labour embodied in international trade and migration in the century prior to 1970, and
examining their relationship with changes in the relative wages of skilled labour. It omits, however,
the potential impact of international capital flows, which is left for further research.4 It is of course
likely that purely “domestic” forces were more important determinants of movements in the relative
wages of skilled labour over the century prior to 1970. This has tended to be the conclusion of other
historical studies of wage inequality (e.g. Williamson & Lindert, 1980; Williamson, 1985), which have
focused on factors such as the growth of skill-intensive sectors and domestic skill accumulation. These
domestic forces are also likely to have led to changes in the amounts of skilled and unskilled labour
embodied in international trade and migration, although in such cases the latter would not have been
exogenous determinants of relative wages.
1.2   The Evidence
This paper focuses on eight now developed countries, comprising three “New World” countries (the
United States, Canada, and Australia), and five “Old World” countries (the UK, Germany, France,
Sweden, and Denmark). It uses two sets of evidence to trace changes in wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled labour, which both use occupation as the indicator of skill.5 The first, and most
widely available, is the average wage of skilled relative to unskilled manual workers, shown in Figure
1.1. In most cases these series refer to workers in the building sector; however, similar data for the
engineering sector suggest that trends in the building sector were broadly similar to those in other
sectors of the economy. A full description of the data and their sources is provided in Appendix 1.1.
The first point to note from the graphs is that, in the 1870s, differences in relative wages between
countries were not substantial. In the US, a typical skilled manual worker received a wage
approximately 50% higher than that of an unskilled labourer, while within Europe, a similar worker
received a wage between approximately 60% (in the UK) and 30% (in Sweden) higher than that of an
unskilled labourer.
Secondly, Figure 1.1 suggests a number of periods into which broad trends in wage inequality can
be divided. For instance, a distinction can be made between the first and second half of the pre-WWI
(1870-1914) period. Between the 1870s and the early 1890s, there was a tendency for the relative
wages of skilled manual workers to rise in the Old World, while falling slightly in the New World.
Between the early 1890s and 1914, on the other hand, relative wages rose significantly in the New
World, while falling rapidly in the Old. Although there were certain exceptions to these broad patterns,
Figure 1.1 suggests that after the early 1890s there was a strong tendency toward the growing
divergence of relative wages between New World and Old.
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Figure 1.1   Relative wages of skilled manual workers, 1870-1965
Notes: The series shown are those in the building sector, except for Canada, where those in the engineering sector are
considered more reliable. Each national series is linked to that of the UK using a set of independent estimates of average
relative wages at either of two “benchmark” years, 1905 and 1927 (see Appendix 1.7). The 1927 results are used except for
the US and France where the 1905 results are considered more reliable. The Swedish and German series are 3 year moving
averages.
Sources: See Appendix 1.1
8A breakdown of trends in wage inequality into broad sub-periods can also be made after 1914.
The first, during WWI, saw the relative wages of skilled manual workers fall, and in many cases –
particularly the US, Canada and the UK – failing to return to their pre-WWI levels following the return
to peacetime conditions. The second, between the early-1920s and late-1930s, was characterised by
broadly stable relative wages in nearly all countries. There then followed a period, roughly between
the late-1930s and late-1950s, in which relative wages fell markedly, with much, although not all, of
the fall occurring during WWII. Finally, between the late-1950s and early-1960s, the relative wages of
skilled manual workers once again tended to stabilise, although at their lowest-ever levels by historical
standards.
Again there were exceptions to these broad patterns. Nevertheless, in marked contrast to the pre-
WWI period, the relative wages of skilled manual workers after 1914 showed a tendency to move in
similar directions in all countries, and to converge rather than diverge among countries. Thus, by the
1960s the international dispersion of relative wages had fallen markedly from its pre-WWI peak, and
had returned to the same low level that had characterised the 1870s.
The second set of evidence on wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour used in this
paper is the average wage of non-manual relative to manual workers, shown in Figure 1.2. Although
this measure is available for a much smaller number of countries and time periods, the graph shows
that in those countries for which both sets of evidence are available, trends in the relative wages of
non-manual workers in the century prior to 1970 showed broad similarities with those of skilled
manual workers.6 While there were certain exceptions, it seems reasonable to conclude that in general,
trends in both sets of relative wages reflected changes in the relative price of a common underlying
attribute of workers called “skill”, and that changes in the relative wages of skilled manual workers
were likely to have been repeated in other wage relativities between occupations requiring different
levels of skill.
The rest of the paper seeks to determine the influence of globalisation on the trends in wage
inequality suggested by Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Section 2 looks at the impact of international migration on
the supply of skilled relative to unskilled labour (hereafter referred to as the relative supply of skilled
labour) in the pre-WWI (1870-1914) period, when migration flows were largest. Sections 3 and 4 then
look at the potential impacts of international trade on the demand for skilled relative to unskilled
labour (hereafter referred to as the relative demand for skilled labour): Section 3 first seeks to
distinguish between supply-side and demand-side influences on relative wages over the whole period
(1870-1970); Section 4 then asks to what extent demand-side influences were driven by international
trade. A final section summarises the findings of the paper, and discusses their implications for the
broader debate on the impact of globalisation on inequality.
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Figure 1.2 Relative wages of non-manual workers, 1870-1965
Notes: The differentials shown refer to workers in a number of sectors.
Sources: See Appendix 1.2
2   INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE RELATIVE SUPPLY OF SKILLED
LABOUR
This section seeks to determine the impact of international migration on the relative supply and
relative wage of skilled labour between 1870 and 1914. One hypothesis to be tested is that mass
migration decreased the relative supply of skilled labour in the New World “receiving” countries, and
increased the relative supply of skilled labour in the Old World “sending” countries, which, other
things being equal, tended to increase relative wages in the New World and reduce them in the Old.
Such a hypothesis assumes that the underlying causes of migration were exogenous to relative
wages. However, it is also possible that the relative number of skilled and unskilled migrants, and their
associated impacts on domestic relative supply, were in fact caused by changes in relative wages
driven by other underlying forces. This section therefore also tests the hypothesis that increasing
relative wages in the New World and falling relative wages in the Old World resulted in migration
flows which increased the relative supply of skilled labour in the New World, and reduced the relative
supply of skilled labour in the Old World.
The section is divided into three parts. Section 2.1 discusses ways of measuring the contribution
of international migration to relative supply before 1914, and presents evidence on the size and
direction of such impacts. Section 2.2 then looks at the relationship between changes in the
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contribution of migration to relative supply and changes in relative wages, first asking which of the
above hypotheses regarding causality the data support, before determining how much of relative wage
behaviour can be accounted for by migration. Section 2.3 concludes.
2.1   Measuring the Contribution of Migration
The total domestic supply of skilled (subscript s) relative to unskilled (subscript u) workers in any one
country can be expressed as consisting of “home” and “foreign” workers, for example:
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where N kt  is the total domestic supply of skill group k in time period t, Lkt  is the supply of “home” or
“native” workers of skill group k in time period t, M kt  is the supply of “foreign” or “migrant” workers
of skill group k in time period t, and mkt  is equal to 
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receiving countries and negative numbers for sending countries. Taking logs, equation (1) can be
written as:
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 measures the contribution of migrant workers to the domestic relative
supply of skilled workers in any year t.
A number of issues arise when seeking to measure the size of this term in the pre-WWI period.
First, it is not possible to observe directly the separate components Lkt  and M kt  of N kt  in equation
(1) above, which correspond to native and migrant stocks of skill group k. The only alternative is to
measure the level of migration flows of skilled and unskilled labour as a proportion of the total
domestic stocks of skilled and unskilled labour. In what follows I sum annual migration flows over
consecutive ten year periods, so that ktm  becomes the ratio of ktM∆ , the total flow of migrants over
each ten year period, to ktL  the total stock of “home” workers at each period end. In sending countries
ktL is equal to total domestic supply, but in receiving countries the total flow of migrants over the
preceeding ten year period is deducted.
Secondly, migration data are usually presented in gross form, whereas, because of return
migration, net rates of migration were often substantially lower. For example, Hatton and Williamson
(1994 p. 5) state that return migration from the US between 1890 and 1914 typically amounted to
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around 30% of the gross inflow. In what follows I use 0.3 as an estimate of the rate of return
migration. However, this is only a first approximation, with further research especially needed to
determine whether the extent of return migration differed between skilled and unskilled workers.7
Thirdly, for the US and Canada it is also not always clear whether the occupations of immigrants
presented in national statistics accurately reflect a migrant’s occupation after entering the country,
rather than occupation prior to entering the country. For example, it is possible that the large numbers
of immigrants listed as farm labourers were in fact assimilated directly into industry, thereby having
more impact on relative wages in industry than would otherwise have been the case. In what follows I
use a narrow occupational definition of “unskilled” immigrants that excludes farm labourers. Their
inclusion, however, would tend to show even larger impacts of immigration on relative supply in these
two countries. In Canada, the issue is further complicated by the fact that the semi-skilled are included
among the unskilled in the migration data, but among the skilled in the domestic employment data. A
rough adjustment was made by dividing the original “unskilled” migrant series by two, and adding the
remaining half to the “skilled” migrant series.
Fourthly, for Germany, Sweden and Denmark a direct breakdown of migrants by skill group
before 1914 is not available. In order to estimate the relative supply impact of migration in these
countries, emigrants from agriculture and general labourers were classified as “unskilled”, while
emigrants from industry were classified as “skilled”. For the home supplies of these “skill” groups,
total domestic agricultural and industrial employment were used respectively. The reasoning behind
this procedure is that, on average, industry is more skill-intensive than agriculture, so that a higher tm
in industry than in agriculture would be expected to reduce the economy-wide relative supply of
skilled labour, and vice versa. Of course, this is not an accurate estimate of the relative supply impact
of migration, as it is not known whether emigration was highest among the more or less skilled
workers within industry or agriculture.
Finally, migration flows by skill group in Sweden between 1874 and 1890, Germany between
1874 and 1900, and Canada between 1880 and 1900 have been estimated from total migration flows,
using each country’s average proportions of that total made up by skilled and unskilled manual
workers during the remainder of the pre-WWI period.
Figure 2.1 shows trends in 
( )
( )ln
1
1
+
+
m
m
st
ut
, the contribution of annual migration flows of skilled and
unskilled manual labour (adjusted for a rate of return migration of 0.3 and summed over ten-year
periods) to the relative supply of “home” skilled manual labour at each period end. It confirms that
international migration before 1914 tended to reduce the relative supply of skilled labour in the New
World. Impacts were often large; for instance, in 1893 the relative supply of skilled manual workers
was approximately 18% (0.18 log points) lower in the US and 27% (0.27 log points) lower in Canada
than it would have been had there been no immigration over the previous 10 years.
12
New World
-0.30
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
1874-83 1884-93 1894-1903 1904-13 1914-23
lo
g 
po
in
ts US
Canada
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
1874-83 1884-93 1894-1903 1904-1913 1914-23
lo
g 
po
in
ts
UK
Denmark
Sw eden
Germany
Figure 2.1   The impact of international migration on the relative supply of skilled manual workers, 1874-1923
Notes: Data on the domestic supplies of skilled and unskilled manual workers before 1900 in the US and 1911 in the UK
have been estimated using the “between” component of relative employment (see Section 3.2). It was not possible to estimate
the impact of migration on the relative supply of skilled manual workers in Canada between 1874 and 1883, as data on the
domestic relative supply of skilled manual workers are unavailable, or in Australia and France throughout the whole period,
as data on the skill composition of migration are unavailable.
Sources: See Appendix 1.3.
Figure 2.1 also suggests that the impact of immigration on relative supply tended to diminish in both
countries; by 1913 the relative supply of skilled manual workers was approximately 14% (0.14 log
points) lower in the US and 15% (0.15 log points) lower in Canada than it would have been had there
been no immigration over the previous 10 years. This reflected the fact that, although absolute flows
were as high as those of the 1880s, the impact of skilled immigration on domestic supply was growing
relative to the impact of unskilled immigration.8 Impacts were still large however; it was the outbreak
of WWI which saw the contribution of immigration to relative supply fall away most dramatically.
13
Among the Old World “sending” countries, Figure 2.1 suggests a more diverse picture. In the
UK, where the data are most reliable, the clear tendency was for emigration to increase the relative
supply of skilled labour. As in the US and Canada, impacts were large: for instance, between 1884 and
1893, emigration from the UK increased the domestic relative supply of skilled labour by
approximately 18% (0.18 log points). Likewise, the relative impact of migration also tended to
diminish in the UK, mainly because of a decline in the rate of emigration among unskilled relative to
skilled workers rather than a decline in total emigration.
Among the other Old World countries, where the underlying data are less reliable, there was no
clear tendency. Figure 2.1 suggests that the impact of emigration before 1914 on the relative supply of
skilled labour in Germany and Denmark was small, not exceeding 2% in any one ten-year period. This
reflects low absolute impacts of emigration; for example, between 1884 and 1893 emigration among
the “unskilled” in these two countries equalled only 3% and 4% respectively of domestic supply,
compared to 16% in Sweden and 20% in the UK. Figure 2.1 also suggests that the impact of
emigration was small in Sweden. However, this reflected low relative impacts of emigration, due to
the fact that the proportions of emigrants among “skilled” and “unskilled” workers in Sweden were
similar. In fact, between 1873 and 1884, a higher proportion of “skilled” than “unskilled” workers
emigrated, decreasing the relative supply of skilled workers, although this tendency had been reversed
by the 1890s.
2.2   Effects on Relative Wages
Figure 2.1 shows that international migration in the pre-WWI period often had large impacts on the
domestic relative supply of skilled labour. What were its effects on relative wages? In order to answer
this question, I first show in Figure 2.2 the relationship between the changes in relative supply due to
migration and changes in relative wages. The observations shown correspond to each of the countries
and pre-WWI time-periods included in Figure 2.1; those for which the skill composition of migration
flows was crudely estimated are shown as circles rather than diamonds.
A negative relationship, with increases/decreases in the relative supply of skilled labour due to
migration associated with decreases/increases in relative wages, would indicate that migration was an
exogenous determinant of relative wages, whereas a positive relationship, with increases/decreases in
the relative supply of skilled labour due to migration associated with increases/decreases in relative
wages, would indicate that migration responded to changes in relative wages driven by other
underlying forces. Figure 2.2 suggests that, in broad terms, the first conclusion applies. However, the
low correlation coefficient also suggests that migration cannot fully explain relative wage behaviour in
the pre-WWI period, and that other explanatory forces must have been important.
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Figure 2.2   Correlation of the relative supply effect of migration flows with changes in relative wages, 1874-1913
Notes: r = -0.39, n = 21. With the exclusion of the crudely estimated observations represented by circles,  r = -0.46, n =16.
It is possible to shed some light on the direction and magnitude of these other forces by calculating, for
each country and time period, the “residual” change in relative wages after the effect of migration is
accounted for. The results of such an exercise are shown in Table 2.1. The first column shows the
“actual” change in relative wages in each period, while the second column shows the “predicted”
change in relative wages, equal to the term 
( )
( )ln
1
1
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+
m
m
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ut
 multiplied by −
1
σ
, where σ is the elasticity
of substitution. The third column then shows the “residual” change in relative wages, equal to the
actual minus the predicted change. A unitary elasticity of substitution is assumed.9
The first row of the table, for instance, shows that immigration in the US between 1874 and 1883
would have increased the relative wage of skilled manual workers by approximately 9% (0.088 log
points), had other determinants of relative wages remained constant. That relative wages of skilled
manual workers actually fell by 4% (0.035 log points) over this period suggests that other factors
reduced relative wages by 12% (0.124 log points), outweighing the effect of immigration.
How much of relative wage behaviour in the New World before 1914 can be accounted for by
immigration? Of the rise in the relative wages of skilled manual workers in the US between 1894 and
1913, more than 100%, given a rate of return migration of 0.3 and a unitary elasticity of substitution.
Between 1874 and 1893, the relative wages of skilled manual workers were in fact falling when
immigration was pushing in the opposite direction; this was also the case for the relative wages of non-
manual workers between 1894 and 1913. In Canada, again more than 100% of the rise in relative
wages between 1903 and 1913 can be accounted for by migration.
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(log points)
Skilled/unskilled manual
Year /country Actual Predicted Residual
US
1874-83 -0.035 0.088 -0.124
1884-93 -0.017 0.183 -0.200
1894-1903 0.051 0.141 -0.090
1904-13 0.048 0.144 -0.096
Canada
1904-13 0.114 0.147 -0.033
UK
1874-83 -0.023 -0.147 0.123
1884-93 -0.044 -0.178 0.135
1894-1903 0.014 -0.090 0.104
1904-13 -0.020 -0.124 0.105
Denmark
1874-83 -0.015 -0.007 -0.008
1884-93 -0.041 -0.007 -0.034
1894-1903 -0.054 0.000 -0.054
1904-13 -0.021 -0.011 -0.011
Sweden
1874-83 0.045 0.085 -0.040
1884-93 0.128 0.004 0.125
1894-1903 -0.105 -0.042 -0.064
1904-13 -0.062 -0.022 -0.039
Germany
1874-83 0.085 0.010 0.075
1884-93 -0.020 0.003 -0.023
1894-1903 -0.046 -0.001 -0.045
1904-13 -0.125 -0.001 -0.125
Non-manual / manual
US
1894-1903 -0.043 0.108 -0.151
1904-13 0.000 0.151 -0.151
UK
1874-83 -0.085 -0.002 -0.084
1884-93 -0.159 -0.008 -0.151
1894-1903 -0.147 0.000 -0.147
1904-13 -0.109 0.002 -0.111
Table 2.1   International migration and the relative wages of skilled labour, 1874-1913: predicted impacts and actual
outcomes
The resulting negative “residual” changes in relative wages suggest two possible conclusions. The first
is that my estimates of the impact of immigration on relative wages are upwardly biased, perhaps
because more unskilled migrants returned than skilled migrants. The second is that there were strong
counteracting forces that served to suppress the impact of immigration on relative wages. One
plausible explanation is that immigration was accompanied by large increases in the “native” relative
supply of skilled labour which offset the impact of immigration on the total “domestic” relative supply
of skilled workers. This is supported by data in Williamson and Lindert (1980 p.211) which suggest
impact of immigration.10
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Another possible explanation is that there were large decreases in the relative demand for skilled
labour, either because of a shift of employment toward less skill-intensive sectors and industries, or
because of a contraction of skilled employment within individual firms and industries. Many authors
have argued that the latter was important, with skill-saving technical change being induced by
immigration. As early as 1911, the United States Immigration Commission argued that:
their [migrants’] employment in the mines and manufacturing plants of this country has been
made possible only by the invention of mechanical devices and processes which have eliminated
the skill and experience formerly required in a large number of occupations (sourced in Thomas,
1973, p.171).
The fact that the “residual” change in relative wages shown in Table 2.1 was smaller in Canada than in
the US may have reflected a smaller impact of either of the above two factors. However, it is less
plausible that the smaller “residual” in the US in the second half of the period reflected smaller
increases in “native” relative supply, or less skill-saving technical change.11 A more likely possibility,
explored further in the next section, is an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour in the
second half of the period due to changes in the inter- (rather than intra-) industrial structure of
employment.
Across Europe, the degree to which changes in relative wages can be accounted for by emigration
varies. In the UK, the decline in the relative wages of skilled manual workers between 1870 and 1914
was less than predicted, as reflected in the positive values in the “residual” column of Table 2.1. As for
the US and Canada, this suggests either that my estimates of the impact of migration on relative supply
are upwardly biased, or that strong counteracting forces offset the impact of migration on relative
wages. In the case of the UK, however, the latter would have to have been in the opposite direction
and, as a decline in the “native” relative supply of skilled manual labour is less plausible, most likely
reflected a large increase in the relative demand for skilled manual labour.12
For Germany and Denmark, Table 2.1 suggests that the relative supply impact of emigration  was
too small to have had a large impact on relative wages. As a result, the fall in relative wages witnessed
throughout the pre-WWI period in Denmark, and from the late-1890s to 1914 in Germany, must have
been due instead either to increasing “native” relative supply of skilled labour, or to a decline in the
relative demand for skilled labour. Similarly, the rise in relative wages in Germany in the early part of
the pre-WWI period must have been due to an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour, again
because the alternative – a decrease in the “native” relative supply of skilled manual labour – is less
plausible.
For Sweden, of the decline in relative wages between 1894 and 1913, Table 2.1 suggests that
between 40% (for 1894-1903) and 35% (for 1904-13) can be accounted for by emigration; the residual
must have reflected, as in Germany and Denmark, either a large increase in the “native” relative
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supply of skilled labour, or a large fall in the relative demand for skilled labour. Of the rise in relative
wages in Sweden between 1874 and 1893, the implications of Table 2.1 are slightly more complicated;
between 1884 and 1893, when emigration had no impact on relative supply, an increase in the relative
demand for skilled labour is the most likely explanation. However, between 1874 and 1883,
emigration can account for more than 100% of the rise in relative wages, suggesting that there must
also have been either an increase in the “native” relative supply of skilled labour or a decrease in the
relative demand for skilled labour.
2.3   Summary
This section shows that international migration between 1870 and 1914 was an exogenous force which
tended to reduce the relative supply of skilled labour in the New World and increase the relative
supply of skilled labour in the Old World. However, the section also finds that:
• the impact of emigration on the relative supply of skilled labour in Germany, Denmark and
Sweden was relatively small. In these countries, other forces are required to explain changes in
wage inequality in the pre-WWI period;
• where the impact of migration on relative supply was larger (the US, Canada, and UK), there were
strong counteracting forces which dampened the impact on wage inequality. In the US and
Canada, the most likely candidates were an increase in the “native” relative supply of skilled
labour or a decline in the relative demand for skilled labour; in the UK, the most likely candidate
was an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour;
• in the US, there is no evidence that the relative supply impact of migration grew larger in the
second half of the period, nor is it likely that counteracting forces grew smaller. In these years, an
increase in the relative demand for skilled labour due to inter-sectoral shifts in employment may
also be required to explain the increase in wage inequality.
Thus, a full accounting of relative wage behaviour between 1870 and 1914 clearly requires the
consideration of shifts in the relative demand for skilled labour and shifts in the “native” relative
supply of skilled labour. This is the aim of the next two sections of the paper, which also extend the
analysis to the post-1914 period. Section 3 seeks to disentangle demand-side from supply-side
influences on relative wages, while section 4 asks whether shifts in the relative demand for skilled
labour were due to international trade.
3   CHANGES IN RELATIVE WAGES – WERE THERE DEMAND-SIDE EFFECTS?
This section asks whether the broad patterns in wage inequality identified in Section 1 were driven
primarily by demand-side or supply-side forces, a common question in the “current” debate on the
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determinants of wage inequality (e.g. Katz & Murphy, 1992; Robbins, 1996). More precisely, given a
CES demand function of the form
w
w
D
N
N
st
ut
st
ut
=



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−
1
σ
(3)
where wkt  is the wage of skill group k in time period t, N kt  is the total domestic supply of skill group
k in time period t, D is a term representing relative demand shifts, and σ  is the elasticity of
substitution, the question is to what extent relative wage behaviour is consistent with the hypothesis
that the demand term D is constant. This necessarily implies a negative relationship between the
relative supply and relative wage of skilled labour. Empirical evidence of such a relationship then
indicates that relative wage movements have the potential to be explained by relative supply shifts
alone, without the need to consider demand shifts. Whether or not relative wage movements can be
explained by relative supply shifts alone depends on the magnitudes involved, and on what value is
assumed for the elasticity of substitution.
The above procedure relies on the assumption that labour markets clear, whereas it is likely,
especially after 1914, that movements in the relative wages of skilled labour reflected changing
institutional influences rather than demand and supply forces alone. Such influences are not considered
in this paper, as they have been extensively documented elsewhere. However, it is worth noting that
although institutional effects may be important in explaining differences between countries in the
exact timing and magnitude of the broad patterns in wage inequality, they are unlikely to be able to
account for the broad patterns themselves.13
In order to disentangle demand-side from supply-side influences, data is required on relative
employment levels by skill group, where the skill groups match those used in constructing the relative
wage series. Such data tends to be limited in availability for much of the period and countries under
consideration, but what exists is utilised in section 3.1. In section 3.2 an indirect source of information
on relative employment is considered, one that is available for the majority of countries and time
periods. Section 3.3 concludes.
3.1   Evidence from the Relative Employment of Skilled Labour
Figure 3.1 shows trends in the relative employment and relative wages of skilled labour for those
countries and time-periods for which both are available. Where the two move in opposite directions,
changes in relative wages have the potential to be explained by relative supply shifts alone; where they
move in the same direction, changes in relative wages cannot be explained without the explicit
consideration of relative demand shifts. For instance, if the rise in wage inequality in the New World
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between the early 1890s and 1914 was due to immigration alone, one would expect Figure 3.1 to show
a combination of rising relative wages and falling relative employment during these years.
Table 3.1 goes one stage further by estimating the size of relative demand shifts in each period
given a unitary elasticity of substitution (σ = 1), close to that of 1.41 used by Borjas et al. (1997).
Again, had the rise in wage inequality in the New World between the early 1890s and 1914 been due
to immigration alone, one would expect Table 3.1 to show little change in relative demand during
these years, as the magnitude of the increase in relative wages would be similar to that of the decline in
relative employment.
Country Skill group * Relative demand, σ = 1 (base year in each country = 100)
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960
UK (a) 100 36 30 31 21
(b) 100 122 121 130 155
US (a) 100 116 115 126 129 161 165
(b) 100 103 86 134 115 105 131
Canada (a) 100 68 58 66 132 155
(b) 100 124 144 125 95 108 133
Table 3.1   Relative demand shifts in the UK, US and Canada, 1900-1960
Notes: * (a) = skilled/unskilled manual; (b) = non-manual/manual. Relative demand is calculated according to the equation
ln ln lnD w
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, which is derived from the logarithmic form of equation (3).
First, the combination of rising relative employment and relative wages in the US between 1900 and
1910 suggests that the rise in wage inequality reflected an increase in the relative demand for skilled
labour rather than a decrease in the relative supply of skilled labour. In contrast, the combination of
falling relative employment and rising relative wages of skilled manual workers in Canada over the
same period suggests that the rise in wage inequality reflected a decrease in the relative supply of
skilled labour rather than an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour.
These results shed further light on the effects of immigration on relative wages in the New World.
In the US, the rise in relative employment suggests that the impact of immigration was offset by
increases in the native relative supply of skilled labour. In contrast, that domestic relative employment
in Canada fell by more than the increase in relative wages suggests that the impact of immigration was
offset by decreases in the relative demand for skilled labour.
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Figure 3.1 Relative employment and relative wages
Notes: Relative employment and relative wages are expressed in logarithms.
Sources and definitions: See Appendix 1.4. “Unskilled manual” excludes farm labourers and domestic/private household
workers. The latter groups were large in size, especially in earlier years, and the above results are somewhat sensitive to their
inclusion. The decision to exclude them is made on the basis of difficulty in defining their skill level and predicting their
impact on the relative wages of skilled manual workers in the building or engineering sectors.
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Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 also shed light on the determinants of trends in wage inequality after
1914. First, the decline in relative wages during WWI appears to have reflected large increases in the
relative demand for unskilled labour.14 Second, the fall in relative wages in the UK between the late
1930s and early 1950s appears to have reflected large increases in relative supply. However, the fall in
the relative wages of non-manual workers in the US and Canada during this period also appears to
have reflected an increase in the relative demand for unskilled labour.15 Finally, the results suggest
that the stability of relative wages during the 1950s reflected a balance between large increases in
relative supply and large increases in relative demand.
However, the drawback of the above procedure is that, as a result of data availability, it can only
be applied to three countries, and to limited time-frames within each. The next sub-section presents an
indirect measure of relative employment that is available for more countries and time periods. This
can then be used to look again at disentangling demand-side from supply-side forces, across the whole
sample rather than just for the above three countries.
3.2   Evidence from the Industrial Structure of Employment
It is possible to consider changes in the relative employment of skilled labour as the combination of
two effects: “between-industry”, in which there is a relative expansion or contraction of employment
by industries that use skilled labour in different proportions; and “within-industry”, in which there is a
relative expansion or contraction of skilled employment within individual firms and industries.
Following Wolff (1996 p.111), the total change in the supply of skill group k can be written in terms
of “between” and “within” components as
kj
j
jkj
j
jk spspN ∆+∆=∆ ∑∑ (4)
where p j  is employment in industry j as a proportion of total employment, and skj  is employment of
skill group k as a proportion of total employment in industry j. In Section 3.1, the relative employment
data shown for the UK, US and Canada incorporate both of these components.
Prior to WWII, employment data are much more common on an industrial basis than they are on
an occupational basis. As a result, changes in the relative employment of skilled labour due purely to
“between-industry” shifts can be estimated for a larger number of countries and time periods than total
changes. By adopting a benchmark-year estimate of skj , and combining it with time-series data on p j ,
it is possible to see what would have happened to relative employment had the within-industry effect
remained constant.16
Furthermore, if changes in the “within” component of relative employment are small, or stable
over time, the sign of the relationship between the “between” component and relative wages will
indicate – as for the case of “total” relative employment in Section 3.1 - whether demand-side or
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supply-side forces were the predominant influences on relative wages. In addition, evidence that
relative demand shifts were important would also indicate that such shifts operated by altering the
distribution of employment among industries using skilled labour in different proportions.
Clearly, the extent to which changes in the “within” component were small relative to changes in
the “between” component, or were stable over time, is important. A comparison of the two can be
made for UK, US and Canada (shown in Appendix 2.3). The results of this comparison suggest that
changes in the “between-industry” component of relative employment account for a much larger part
of total changes in the US and Canada than in the UK. This reflected the fact that the shift from
agriculture to manufacturing – an important source of the increasing relative employment of skilled
labour – had largely ended in the UK by the late nineteenth century, on account of its mature stage of
industrialisation.17 As the UK was unique in this respect, one would expect other countries in the
sample to follow the US pattern. Thus changes in the “between-industry” component do arguably
provide a useful approximation to changes in total relative employment for the majority of countries
and time periods covered in this paper.
Figures 3.2a and 3.2b show trends in the “between-industry” component of relative employment
together with relative wages. What do they imply regarding the relative importance of demand-side
and supply-side forces in explaining the broad patterns in wage inequality identified in Section 1?
First, the combination of rising relative wages and rising “between-industry” component of relative
employment in the US between 1900 and 1910 suggests that the increase in wage inequality during
those years was driven by an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour that operated by
shifting the structure of employment toward more skill-intensive sectors. However, there is less
evidence that this was the case for the rise in wage inequality during the 1890s, when the “between-
industry” component of relative employment did not change substantially.18
Figure 3.2b suggests that similar demand-side forces may also have been behind the increase in
wage inequality witnessed in Germany and Sweden between 1870 and 1890, and in Denmark during
the 1880s. However, such forces clearly cannot explain the fall in wage inequality between 1890 and
1910 in these countries, when relative wages and the between- industry component of relative
employment were negatively related. Instead, Figure 3.2b suggests that these trends were driven either
by an expansion of relative supply, or by a fall in the relative demand for skilled labour reflected in
“within-industry” shifts in employment.
For the UK, Figure 3.2a suggests that supply-side forces were predominant in the pre-WWI
period, given that changes in relative wages and the “between-industry” component of relative
employment were negatively related over this period. However, it was suggested in Section 2 that the
fall in the relative wage of skilled manual labour before 1914 was smaller than expected given the
impact of emigration; thus, after accounting for the impact of emigration, changes in the relative
wages and relative employment of skilled manual labour in the UK were more likely to have been
positively related over this period, suggesting that there was an increase in the relative demand for
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skilled manual labour reflected in “between-industry” shifts in employment, especially between 1871
and 1901, when such employment shifts were large.
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Figure 3.2a   Relative employment implied by between-industry employment shifts, and relative wages: US, Canada
and UK
Notes: Relative wages and relative employment are expressed in logarithms.
Sources: See Appendices 1.5 and 3.2.
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Figure 3.2b   Relative employment implied by between-industry employment shifts, and relative wages: Germany,
France, Sweden and Denmark
Notes: Relative wages and relative employment are expressed in logarithms.
Sources: See Appendices 1.5 and 3.2.
These findings are also able to shed more light on the determinants of trends in wage inequality after
1914. For instance, the substantial decline in relative wages in all countries during the 1910-20 decade
was negatively related to trends in the “between-industry” component of relative employment. This
suggests that the fall was due either to a large increase in the relative supply of skilled labour, or a
large increase in the relative demand for unskilled labour due to “within-industry” shifts in
employment. Between 1920 and 1930, however, there is evidence that inter-industry shifts in
employment increased the relative demand for skilled labour in the US and Canada, where both the
between-industry component of relative employment and relative wages increased during this decade
(with the exception of non-manual labour in the US). In Europe, on the other hand, movements in
relative wages during this decade appear to be more the result of either changes in relative supply or
changes in relative demand due to “within-industry” shifts in employment.
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Similarly, that the decline in relative wages in all countries between the late 1930s and 1950s, in
the majority of cases, coincided with increases in the between-industry component of relative
employment suggests that it reflected large increases in the relative supply of skilled labour, or
declines in the relative demand for skilled labour at the within-industry level. There were certain
exceptions to this pattern; for instance, during the 1950s in the UK, US, and Canada, increasing
relative wages for non-manual (not for skilled manual) labour coincided with increases in the between-
industry component of relative employment; this was also the case for skilled manual labour in France
and Denmark. In these cases, relative wage behaviour is consistent with an increase in relative demand
due to exogenous shifts in the inter-industry structure of employment.
3.3   Summary
This section sheds light on the determinants of wage inequality in the century prior to 1970 by
disentangling demand-side from supply-side influences. It finds that:
• in the US, increasing wage inequality between 1900 and 1910 was not consistent with an
explanation based on immigration. Instead, the rise reflected an increase in the relative demand for
skilled labour due to a shift in employment toward skill-intensive sectors and industries. The rise
in the domestic relative employment of skilled labour also suggests that the impact of immigration
on relative wages was offset by increases in “native” relative supply;
• in Canada, increasing wage inequality between skilled and unskilled manual workers between
1901 and 1911 was consistent with an explanation based on immigration. The size of the fall in
total domestic relative employment also suggests that the impact of immigration on relative wages
was offset by exogenous decreases in relative demand;
• in the Old World, increasing relative wages in Sweden and Germany between 1870 and 1890, and
in Denmark between 1880 and 1890, are consistent with increasing relative demand due to shifts
of employment toward skill-intensive sectors and industries. The latter are also able to account for
the smaller fall in relative wages in the UK between 1870 and 1900 than predicted by emigration.
However, such forces cannot explain the decline in relative wages in the latter half of the pre-
WWI period in mainland Europe;
• the fall in relative wages in all countries during WWI on the whole reflected increases in the
relative demand for unskilled labour, operating primarily via “within-industry” shifts in
employment;
• the fall in relative wages in most countries between the late 1930s and early 1950s also reflected
increases in the relative demand for unskilled labour via “within-industry” shifts in employment,
but also reflected large increases in the relative supply of skilled labour;
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• the stability of relative wages in the UK, US and Canada during the 1950s represented continued
large increases in the relative supply of skilled labour, offset by increases in the relative demand
for skilled labour.
Thus shifts in the relative demand for skilled labour, due to shifts in employment between industries
using skilled labour in different proportions, were often important. The next section considers the role
of international trade, as one possible source of such shifts.
4   INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE RELATIVE DEMAND FOR SKILLED LABOUR
This section asks whether changes in the level and commodity composition of trade (hereafter referred
to as the pattern of trade) influenced trends in wage inequality over the century prior to 1970. One
hypothesis to be tested is that increases/decreases in (net) exports of relatively skill-intensive
commodities were associated with increases/decreases in the relative demand for skilled labour which,
other things being equal, led to increases/decreases in relative wages. Such a hypothesis assumes that
changes in the trade pattern were autonomous to changes in relative wages, instead resulting from
exogenous forces such as declining barriers to trade. However, it is possible that the pattern of trade
also responded to changes in relative wages driven by supply-side forces. This section therefore also
explores whether increases/decreases in the domestic relative supply of skilled labour were associated
with increases/decreases in (net) exports of relatively skill-intensive products and decreases/increases
in relative wages.
The organisation of the sections is as follows. Section 4.1 first uses factor-content of trade (FCT)
calculations for the UK and US as a means of comparing the size of the impact of trade with that of
migration on the relative employment of skilled labour. It then uses a simpler method, based on data
on net exports of certain broad commodity groups, in order to estimate the impact of trade on relative
employment in all countries and time periods. Section 4.2 then asks whether trade was a significant
exogenous determinant of relative wages. Section 4.3 concludes.
4.1   Measuring the Impact of Trade
Factor-content of trade approach
One method of estimating the impact of trade on the relative employment of skilled labour, which has
been used frequently in the “current” debate, is the factor content of trade (FCT) approach (Wood,
1994 chap.3). This procedure involves calculating the amount of skilled and unskilled labour
embodied in trade flows: the employment of either is said to be increased/reduced by trade if a
larger/smaller quantity is used per dollar of exports than per dollar of imports.  Firstly, factor-content
coefficients for a country’s exports are calculated as:
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Axzx =
where A is a (q x r) matrix specifying the quantity of each of the q factors used per million dollars of
output in each of the r sectors of the economy, and x is an (r x 1) vector of sectoral shares of total
exports (which sum to unity). Similarly, factor-content coefficients for a country’s competing imports
are calculated as:
Amzm =
where m is an (r x 1) vector of sectoral shares of total competing imports. The factor-content
coefficients xz and mz thus specify the average use of skilled and unskilled labour per million dollars
of exports and imports, weighted by the sectoral shares of total exports and imports respectively.
Given balanced trade, the impact of trade on factor use is calculated as
)( mx zzXZ −=
where Z is a (q x 1) vector of factor quantities and X is the total value of a country’s exports. The sign
of the impact of trade on the use of any one factor depends on whether xz  is greater or smaller than
mz ; the size of the impact depends on the difference between xz  and mz , and on the total volume of
exports.
A number of methodological issues arise when calculating the factor content of trade prior to the
current period. Firstly, due to data availability, the level of disaggregation by sector is low. This means
that the calculations will tend to understate the impact of trade on factor use, as exports and imports do
not tend to be equally distributed among all goods within broadly defined sectors. Secondly, in order
to estimate the factor-input coefficients in matrix A above, it was necessary to use information on the
proportion of total employment in each sector made up by skilled and unskilled manual employment,
for which the earliest years available were 1960 for the US and 1951 for the UK. This will also lead to
an understating of the amount of skilled and unskilled labour embodied in trade, due to the long-run
tendency in both countries for the share of non-manual employment to increase. Finally, much of the
trade in primary products consisted of “non-competing” imports, in which case the relevant factor-
input coefficient is zero (ibid., p.72-74). Exactly how much trade was non-competing, however, is hard
to determine; in what follows therefore, calculations are made using two alternative assumptions, one
in which all imports of primary products are assumed to be competing, and another in which all are
assumed to be non-competing.19
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UK US
1899 1913 1937 1899 1913 1937
Factor content per $m of
exports, no. of workers
Skilled manual 99 91 86 21 22 25
Unskilled manual 50 52 46 32 22 19
Skill-intensity 2.0 1.8 1.9 0.7 1.0 1.3
Factor content per $m of
imports, no. of workers
Skilled manual 80 82 60 15 13 14
Unskilled manual 111 109 91 31 25 28
Skill-intensity 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5
Total exports, $m 3,927 6,427 2,578 3,717 5,286 3,299
Factor content of trade, ‘000
workers
Skilled manual 59.8 62.4 68.0 23.3 51.7 37.1
Unskilled manual -238.4 -367.5 -116.5 1.0 -14.6 -30.3
Domestic employment,‘000
workers
Skilled manual 5,601 5,618 4,297 5,641
Unskilled manual 1,962 2,993 4,606 5,013
Table 4.1 Factor content of trade (FCT) calculations for the US and UK, 1899, 1913 and 1937
Notes: The results shown are based on the assumption that all primary imports are competing. They are also based on the
assumption of balanced trade, although for the purposes of this paper, the relevant assumption is that there was no change in
the balance of trade between the above years. Underlying data (factor-input coefficients, employment shares of skilled and
unskilled manual workers, and sectoral shares of exports and imports) are contained in Appendix 3. Domestic employment
data in 1913 and 1937 are interpolated estimates between the data at ten-year intervals presented in Section 3.1.
Table 4.1 shows the FCT calculations for the US and UK at three points in time: 1899, 1913 and 1937.
It indicates that in the UK in 1899, a million dollars of exports embodied on average 99 skilled
workers and 50 unskilled workers, while a million dollars of imports embodied 80 skilled workers and
111 unskilled workers. Given total exports of $3,927m, trade is estimated to increase the employment
of skilled manual workers by 59,800, and reduce the employment of unskilled manual workers by
238,400. However, the relevant question is whether changes in the pattern of trade had a large impact
on the domestic relative employment of skilled labour. In the US, between 1899 and 1913 changes in
trade increased the employment of skilled manual workers by 0.7% and decreased the employment of
unskilled manual workers by 0.3% (when measured as a percentage of the total domestic employment
of each skill group in 1913), implying an increase in the relative employment of skilled labour of about
1% (0.010 log points).20 Between 1913 and 1937 changes in the pattern of trade reduced the
employment of both skilled and unskilled manual labour by 0.3%, thus having little effect on relative
employment. For the UK, Table 4.1 suggests that between 1899 and 1913 changes in the trade pattern
had little impact on the employment of skilled manual workers, but reduced the employment of
unskilled manual workers by 6.6%, implying an increase in the relative employment of skilled manual
workers of approximately 7% (0.068 log points). Between 1913 and 1937 changes in the pattern of
trade increased the employment of skilled manual labour by 0.1%, while increasing the employment of
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unskilled manual labour by 8.4%, implying a decrease in relative employment of approximately 8%
(0.080) log points.
The results in Table 4.1 are based on the assumption that all primary imports were competing.
Under the alternative assumption that all primary imports were non-competing, the above results are
very similar for the US, but different for the UK; in this case, changes in the pattern of trade between
1899 and 1913 reduced the relative employment of skilled manual labour by approximately 3% (0.031
log points), and between 1937 and 1937 increased the relative employment of skilled labour by
approximately 0.8% (0.008 log points).
Overall, the evidence for the US and UK suggests that the impact of trade on the relative
employment of skilled labour was smaller than that of migration. Comparing Table 4.1 with Table 2.1
of Section 2 suggests that the latter was over ten times as large as the former in the US, and
approximately twice as large in the UK. However, the impacts of trade were clearly not negligible in
the UK, where changes in the changes in the pattern of trade in the pre-WWI period may have
contributed to the increase in relative demand for skilled manual workers, but only if the majority of
primary imports were competing.
Net exports of total manufactures and skill-intensive manufactures
While the data requirements of the FCT procedure preclude its use for all countries and time periods,
an alternative and simpler way of measuring the impact of trade on the relative employment of skilled
labour is to look at trends in net exports of certain broad commodity groupings, as in Figures 4.1 and
4.2. Figure 4.1 shows trends in net exports of total manufactures; positive values mean that, given
balanced trade, the share of manufactures in total exports exceeds their share in total imports, which
will tend to imply, given the factor-input coefficients used in Table 4.1, a positive impact of trade on
the relative employment of skilled labour. Similarly, Figure 4.2 shows trends in net exports of “skill-
intensive” manufactures, broadly defined as exports of machinery and chemical products; positive
values mean that, given balanced trade, the share of such products in total manufactured exports
exceeds their share in total manufactured imports, which will also tend to imply a positive impact of
trade on relative employment.
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Figure 4.1 Trends in net exports of total manufactures, 1870-1965
Notes: Manufactures are generally defined in the statistical sources as “finished products”, not including “semi-
manufactures”. All series are 3-year moving averages.
Sources: See Appendix 1.6.
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Figure 4.2 Trends in net exports of “skill-intensive” manufactures, 1870-1965
Notes: “Skill-intensive” manufactures are machinery and chemicals for the UK, Germany and Canada, machinery only for
the US and chemicals only for Sweden. It was not possible to construct such a series for France, Denmark or Australia. The
data for Germany refer to gross exports, which are misleading as a guide to effects on relative wages if they were
accompanied by increases in skill-intensive imports. However, data in Maizels (1963 p. 446, 479) suggests that, between
1899 and 1913, net exports of machinery and chemicals actually grew faster than gross exports. All series are 3-year moving
averages.
Sources: See Appendix 1.6.
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Increases or decreases in each variable can therefore be interpreted as approximating increases or
decreases in the relative employment of skilled labour, if there is no change in the trade balance. And
when expressed as a percentage of GDP, changes will occur not only as a result of compositional
changes within total exports or imports, but also as a result of changes in the overall volume of trade.
Of course, if the trade balance does change, the ratio of net exports of manufactures or skill-intensive
manufactures to GDP will also change. However, in what follows, it is assumed that an
increase/decrease in net exports of total or skill-intensive manufactures because of an
increase/decrease in the trade balance has the same impact on relative employment as a change owing
to increases/decreases in the volume or composition of trade.21
For example, the increase in the relative employment of skilled labour in the UK between 1899
and 1913 identified in Table 4.1 is approximated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 by an increase in net exports of
total and skill-intensive manufactures as a proportion of GDP.22 It is immediately clear that trade was
likely to have led to larger changes in the relative employment of skilled labour in other time-periods
and countries; for instance, the substantial fall in net exports of all manufactures in the UK between
1870 and 1900 would be expected to have significantly reduced the relative employment of skilled
labour (although the fact that net exports of skill-intensive manufactures increased over the same
period may have dampened this impact). Similarly, the large increase in net exports of both total and
skill-intensive manufactures in Germany between 1890 and 1914 would have increased the relative
employment of skilled labour. Other instances in which changes in the pattern of trade are likely to
have been associated with large changes in relative employment include the large fall in net exports of
both total and skill-intensive manufactures during the early 1930s and the large subsequent increases
in the immediate post-WWII years, both of which occurred in the majority of countries.
4.2   Effects on Relative Wages
While the above identifies the most likely instances in which changes in the trade pattern affected
the relative employment of skilled labour, it remains to be asked whether such changes represented
important and exogenous influences on relative wages capable of explaining the changes in relative
demand for skilled labour identified in Section 3.2. In order to answer this question, this section
explores the correlation between the “between-industry” component of relative employment presented
in Section 3.2 and the changing pattern of trade shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2; if trade did have an
important impact on the economy-wide relative demand for skilled labour, one would expect to find a
close positive relationship between these variables. If not, other domestic determinants of relative
demand and the inter-industry structure of employment must have been more important. This section
also looks at the correlation between changes in the pattern of trade and relative wages; if trade was a
truly exogenous influence, one would expect to find a positive relationship between trade-related
changes in relative employment and changes in relative wages. A negative relationship, on the other
hand, would indicate that changes in the domestic relative supply of skilled labour was the exogenous
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driving force, simultaneously leading to higher/lower net exports of both total and skill-intensive
manufactures, and declining/increasing relative wages.
In the pre-WWI period, there is little evidence that changes in the pattern of trade represented an
important and exogenous influence on the relative demand for skilled labour in the Old World
countries. In the UK, the fact that the decline in net exports of manufactures between 1870 and 1900
occurred when the “between-industry” component of relative employment was growing rapidly
suggests that domestic forces were more important determinants of the relative employment of skilled
labour, outweighing the negative impact of trends in net exports. Thus it appears from Figures 4.1 and
4.2 that the increase in the relative demand for skilled manual labour in the UK before 1914 was
driven by domestic forces rather than trade.
In Germany, there was little change in net exports of either total or skill-intensive manufactures
as a proportion of GDP between 1870 and 1890, again suggesting that domestic forces drove the
increase in the relative demand for skilled labour identified for this period in Section 3.2. Furthermore,
between 1890 and 1914, when there was a large increase in net exports of total and skill-intensive
manufactures, relative wages in fact fell. This suggests that the change in the trade pattern over this
period, although large, was not an exogenous influence on relative wages; instead it represented an
endogenous response to a large increase in the relative supply of skilled labour.
In Denmark and France, there was little change in net exports of total manufactures as a
proportion of GDP in the pre-WWI period, suggesting that the impact of trade on the relative
employment of skilled labour was likely to have been small. In Sweden, although there was a steady
increase in net exports of total manufactures, declining net exports of “skill-intensive” manufactures
implied that the overall impact of trade on relative employment was also likely to have been small. As
a result, increases in the relative demand for skilled labour between 1870 and 1890 in Sweden, and
during the 1880s in Denmark, also appear to be attributable mainly to domestic forces.
Turning to the New World countries in the pre-WWI period, in the US increasing relative wages
of skilled manual workers between the early 1890s and 1914 were associated with rising net exports of
both total and skill-intensive manufactures, which is consistent with trade being an exogenous driving
force behind the widening of wage inequality. This process may have been related to the closing up of
the frontier during the 1890s; beforehand, as the frontier expanded, land-labour ratios would have
remained relatively constant despite population growth and immigration. As the frontier closed,
however, land-labour ratios would have begun to fall, resulting in a shift in comparative advantage
away from primary products toward manufactures, and an increase in the relative demand for skilled
labour.
One problem with this hypothesis is that the correlation between inter-industry employment shifts
and changes in the trade pattern is not high: as was shown in section 3.2, the largest increases in the
“between-industry” component of relative employment took place during the 1880s and between
1900-20, with only small changes between during the 1890s when increases in net exports of skill-
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intensive products were largest. Furthermore, the FCT calculations in Table 4.1 indicate only a small
impact of the changing pattern of trade on relative employment, as the size of (net) exports of both
total and skill intensive manufactures relative to total GDP remained small.
In Canada, there was a large decline in net exports of manufactures as a percentage of GDP in the
latter half of the pre-WWI period, which would have tended to reduce the relative employment of
skilled labour. Evidence on the industrial structure of employment before 1911 is not available, but the
fact that the total relative employment of skilled labour between 1901 and 1911 fell by much more
than the rise in relative wages may have been due to this change in the trade pattern. Thus the evidence
suggests that trade in Canada before 1914 was another important and exogenous influence on relative
wages, which reduced the relative demand for skilled labour and offset the increase in wage inequality
caused by immigration.
After 1914, there is again little evidence that trade represented an important and exogenous
influence on the relative demand for skilled labour. Surprisingly, the large decreases in net exports of
total and skill-intensive manufactures as a proportion of GDP in the majority of countries during the
late 1920s and early 1930s were associated with stable rather than falling relative wages. One possible
reason is that domestic influences on the relative demand for skilled labour offset the negative
influence of trade, as changes in the “between-industry” component of relative employment shown in
Section 3.2 tended to be smaller than the changes in the trade pattern, the former falling only in France
during the 1930s.
Two countries that saw different trends in the pattern of trade during the inter-war period were
Canada and Denmark, where net exports of total manufactures grew steadily. In these countries the
“between-industry” component of relative employment also grew faster after 1914 than before,
suggesting that these trends in the trade pattern did have an important influence on the structure of
employment. In Canada, where relative wages were stable or rising slightly over this period, the
suggestion is that the change in the trade pattern provided a source of increasing relative demand. In
Denmark, however, where relative wages continued falling during this period, the suggestion is that
the changing trade pattern was not an exogenous demand-side force, instead reflecting increasing
relative supply.23
In the immediate post-WWII years, there is evidence to suggest that the large increases in net
exports of all and skill-intensive manufactures were associated with large increases in the “between-
industry” component of relative employment, and therefore that trade did provide an important
contribution to the large increases in the economy-wide relative employment of skilled labour that
occurred during these years. Even so, domestic considerations must have been equally important,
especially during the 1950s when, despite the fact that the ratio of net exports of total and skill-
intensive manufactures to GDP tended to stabilise or decline, there was no sign of smaller inter-
industry employment shifts. Furthermore, the fact that relative wages tended to fall in the majority of
countries over this period is evidence that once again changes in the trade pattern were not an
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exogenous determinant of relative wage behaviour. Instead, both the increase in net exports of
relatively skill-intensive products and falling relative wages are more consistent with a large increase
in the domestic relative supply of skilled labour.
4.3   Summary
This section asks whether changes in the level and commodity composition of trade influenced trends
in wage inequality over the century prior to 1970. It finds that:
• the impacts of changes in the pattern of trade on the relative employment of skilled labour were
smaller than the impacts of migration;
• there are certain instances in which trade was also likely to have represented an important and
exogenous influence on relative wage behaviour. One such example was Canada in the pre-WWI
period, when trade appeared to contribute to the large fall in the relative demand for skilled
manual workers identified in Section 3.1;
• however, there was often a tendency for the impacts of changes in the pattern of trade on the
relative employment of skilled labour to be offset by important domestic forces. Such forces may
have included increases in domestic consumption or investment demand for skill-intensive
products, perhaps associated with a high income elasticity of demand for manufactures relative to
agricultural products, and the growth of new skill-intensive industries within manufacturing;
• in those instances in which changes in the pattern of trade did have a close positive relationship
with changes in the economy-wide relative employment of skilled labour, such as in the immediate
post-WWII period, relative wages were tending to fall. The implication for these years is that,
rather than increasing net exports of skill-intensive products driving up relative wages, large
increases in the domestic relative supply of skilled labour simultaneously led to increasing net
exports of skill-intensive products, and falling relative wages.
5   CONCLUSION
This paper studies the impact of globalisation on wage inequality in a group of eight now-developed
countries during the hundred years prior to 1970. The dependent variable – the wage of skilled relative
to unskilled labour - and methodology it uses are those of the debate regarding the impact of
globalisation since 1970. The countries studied include three “New World” countries: the US, Canada,
and Australia; and five “Old World” countries: the UK, Germany, France, Sweden and Denmark. This
final section first summarises the main findings of the paper; it then goes on to discuss the implications
of these findings for the broader debate on the impact of globalisation on inequality within countries.
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5.1   Summary
On the basis of the previous four sections, and certain other studies, Figure 5.1 presents a stylised
accounting of trends in the relative demand, relative supply, and relative wages of skilled workers
between 1870 and 1970 in New and Old Worlds. For each region, one line is shown corresponding to
the relative supply of skilled labour, and another to the relative demand for skilled labour, the vertical
distance between the two lines representing the relative wage of skilled labour. When the two lines are
parallel, the inference is that relative supply and demand are growing at the same rate, and that relative
wages are constant. In the interests of clarity, Figure 5.1 highlights the most important differences
between the two regions; differences within each region are referred to in the discussion.
Below each graph a table summarises the underlying forces driving the changes in relative
demand and supply. There are two which affect relative demand. The first is labelled inter-sectoral
(IS), referring to shifts in employment between sectors and industries that use skilled labour in
different proportions. For example, increases in the share of employment in manufacturing, and,
especially after 1914, new skill-intensive industries within manufacturing, increase the relative
demand for skilled labour, although the main effect of the latter may be to increase the relative demand
for the “semi-skilled”, rather than the traditional skilled manual workers considered in this paper.24
The second is labelled aggregate demand (AD): periods of high aggregate demand (which included the
two world wars as special cases) increase the relative demand for unskilled labour, thus tending to
reduce relative wages, while periods of low aggregate demand reduce the relative demand for
unskilled labour, thus tending to increase relative wages (Phelps Brown, 1977 p.76-77). There are two
forces which affect the relative supply of skilled labour; one labelled migration (M), referring to the
effect of international migration, and another labelled native relative supply (N), referring to increases
in the relative supply of skilled labour due primarily to the expansion of education.
Thus, Figure 5.1 indicates that in the New World between 1870 and 1914, the relative supply of
skilled labour increases despite the impact of immigration, because of large increases in the “native”
relative supply of skilled labour. Between 1870 and 1890, there is little change in the relative demand
for skilled labour, so that relative wages fall slightly. Between 1890 and 1914, however, relative
demand increases because of inter-sectoral effects, so that relative wages rise. This description
corresponds most closely to the US case; in Canada, the relative supply of skilled labour does fall over
this period, and there is no increase in relative demand. Relative wages therefore also rise, but for
different reasons.
In the New World between 1914 and 1955, relative supply accelerates, as a result of the end of
immigration and an expansion of education, now tending to match the continued increase in relative
demand.25 However, between 1914 and 1920 there is a temporary increase in the relative demand for
unskilled labour associated with WWI, so that relative wages fall. Furthermore, during the 1920s
continued high levels of aggregate demand mean that, while relative demand and supply grow at the
same rate, relative wages remain at a level lower than that implied by inter-sectoral effects.26
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Figure 5.1 Stylised trends in the relative demand and supply of skilled labour, New and Old Worlds, 1870-1970
Notes: In the box below each graph, demand-side (D) explanatory forces include inter-sectoral shifts in employment (IS) and
the level of aggregate demand (AD); supply-side (S) explanatory forces include international migration (M) and changes in the
native relative supply of skilled labour (N). The dashed demand line indicates the level of relative demand due to inter-sectoral
effects only. For example, if the dashed line is rising more steeply than the continuous line, this indicates that “structural”
pressures to increase the relative demand for skilled labour are being offset by strong aggregate demand pressures to raise the
relative demand for unskilled labour.
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The subsequent low levels of aggregate demand during the 1930s would normally be expected to
reverse this suppression of the level of relative wages. That this did not occur suggests that low
aggregate demand also slowed the expansion of new skill-intensive industries. Thus, Figure 5.1 shows
a temporary levelling of the dashed demand-line in the New World during the 1930s; although relative
demand and supply continue to grow at the same rate, increases in the former are driven by aggregate
demand rather than inter-sectoral effects.
Between 1940 and 1955 relative wages fall, as WWII and continued high levels of aggregate
demand during the post-war economic boom increase the relative demand for unskilled labour,
offsetting increases in the relative demand for skilled labour due to inter-sectoral effects.27 The fall
continues until 1955, when the increase in relative supply slows down as educational expansion begins
to reach a limit, and relative wages stabilise.
Turning to the Old World, between 1870 and 1890 the relative demand for skilled labour
increases due to inter-sectoral effects. Although relative supply is increasing, the increase in relative
demand is large enough to push up relative wages. Between 1890 and 1914, however, relative demand
stabilises while relative supply continues to increase, so that relative wages fall. During WWI, relative
wages again fall due to an increase in the relative demand for unskilled labour, although – unlike the
New World – this is soon reversed given the low level of aggregate demand during the 1920s.
Between 1920 and 1939, the relative demand for skilled labour increases, but mainly because of
aggregate demand rather than inter-sectoral effects; as in the New World during the 1930s, relative
wages would have risen had both been in operation. Thus in the Old World throughout the inter-war
period, the dashed demand-line in Figure 5.1 falls below the continuous line, indicating that relative
wages would have continued to fall had demand reflected purely inter-sectoral effects.
After 1940, the relative demand for skilled labour does increase due to inter-sectoral effects.
However, between 1940 and 1955 relative wages fall, because WWII and continued high levels of
aggregate demand during the post-war economic boom increase the relative demand for unskilled
labour, and because relative supply accelerates.28
The experience of the UK differs from Figure 5.1 before 1914, when relative wages fall steadily
in both the 1870-90 and 1890-1914 periods, and during WWI, when the fall in relative wages is
permanent rather than transitory. In the former case, it appears that a growing relative supply of skilled
labour due to emigration was more or less balanced throughout the period by a growing relative
demand for skilled labour due to domestic inter-sectoral effects. In the latter case it appears that the
war and its immediate aftermath brought about a large and permanent negative shift in the relative
demand for skilled labour.29
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5.2   Implications for the Broader Debate
Recent research suggests that globalisation since 1970 has had a large impact on inequality between
workers with different levels of skills (Wood, 1994, 1995). Recent research has also suggested that
globalisation before 1970 had a large impact on inequality (O’Rourke et al., 1996; Williamson, 1997).
To date, evidence on the impact of globalisation before 1970 has focused on two dimensions of
inequality: wage-rental ratios (measuring inequality between unskilled workers and landowners), and
wage-productivity ratios (measuring inequality between unskilled workers and the average returns to
all factors, including land, capital, labour, and skills). This paper adds to this evidence by explicitly
analysing the impact of globalisation before 1970 on inequality between workers with different levels
of skills. In doing so it also provides some interesting comparisons between the impacts of
globalisation on wage inequality before and after 1970. The paper finds that:
1. Trends in wage inequality in the pre-WWI period (1870-1914) of globalisation were broadly similar
to the trends shown by wage-rental and wage-productivity ratios, which increased in the New World
and decreased in the Old. There were, however, a number of important differences. First, the similarity
of trends exists only after 1890; before that date, wage inequality had tended to increase in the Old
World and decrease in the New, contrary to the trends shown by wage-rental and wage-productivity
ratios. Secondly, movements in wage inequality after 1890 represented a process of relative factor-
price divergence, rather than the convergence shown by wage-rental ratios. Thirdly, in contrast to
wage-productivity ratios, there was no tendency for wage inequality to fall further in Sweden and
Denmark than in the UK, Germany and France,.
2. The impact of globalisation in the pre-WWI period on wage inequality was generally smaller than
that on wage-rental and wage-productivity ratios. International trade did not have a significant impact
on wage inequality in either New or Old World, which contrasts with the findings of O’Rourke et al.
(1996), who report that commodity market integration in this period had a large impact on wage-rental
ratios. Mass international migration in the pre-WWI period did sometimes have a large impact on
wage inequality, but mainly in the New World countries of the US and Canada. This differs from the
findings of Williamson (1997), who reports that that mass international migration had a large impact
on wage-productivity ratios in both New and Old Worlds, contributing to particularly large falls in the
countries of the Old World periphery, such as Sweden and Denmark.
3. After 1914, although there was a clear end to the process of increasing wage inequality in the New
World and falling inequality in the Old World, wage inequality tended to move in similar directions in
all countries. This differs from the findings of Williamson (1997), that the inter-war (1920-1939)
period saw a reversal of the pre-WWI trends in wage-productivity ratios, which fell in the New World
and rose in the Old World. “De-globalisation” in the inter-war period, characterised by the reduction
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of trade flows, had little impact on wage inequality, and nor did the subsequent increase in trade in the
immediate post-WWII period.
4. The impact of globalisation on wage inequality before 1970 tended to be smaller than its impact
since 1970, except in the case of mass immigration in the New World before 1914. International trade
did not at any stage have the importance which has been attached to it in the current debate.
Many of these findings are somewhat unexpected. It is surprising that international trade before 1970
did not have more impact, in comparison both with its impact on wage-rental ratios before 1970 and
with its impact on wage inequality after 1970, given the large changes in openness to trade that took
place in the period under study. The pre-WWI period witnessed large reductions in transport and
communication costs, which probably matched those of the recent period. The years after 1914 first
saw a reversal of this trend, due to large increases in artificial trade barriers during the 1920s and
1930s, followed by a re-emergence after WWII due to the dismantling of trade barriers and further
reductions in the costs of international transport and communication.30
This puzzle seems smaller when one considers certain important differences between
globalisation before and after 1970. Globalisation between 1870 and 1914 involved the economic
integration of two regions (New and Old World) that differed most significantly in terms of their
relative endowments of land and labour. Reductions in trade barriers led to an expansion of demand
for land in the New World and for labour in the Old, leading to the convergence of wage-rental ratios.
Globalisation since 1970 has involved integration between two regions (North and South) that differ
most significantly in terms of their relative endowments of skilled and unskilled labour. Reductions in
trade barriers in this case have led to an expansion of demand for skilled labour in the North and for
unskilled labour in the South, leading to the convergence of relative wages.
Thus there are two main reasons why international trade was not a significant exogenous driving
force behind movements in wage inequality before 1970. First, the exchange of primary products for
manufactures between New and Old World prior to 1970, while having a large impact on the demand
for land relative to labour in each region, did not apparently affect the demand for skilled relative to
unskilled labour in either region. This in turn may have been due to two possible reasons: one, that the
average skill-intensity of manufactures and primary products did not differ substantially in this period;
and two, that unskilled workers in the agricultural and industrial sectors were non-competing groups.
Secondly, trade in manufactures between 1870 and 1914, although substantial, was not driven by
broad differences in skill endowments between countries. This conclusion differs from that of some
other studies;31 however, it is supported by the fact that differences in the relative price of skills among
these countries were not great, and in fact tended to diverge over this period (rather than converging
between skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries).
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This conclusion also provides clues as to why “de-globalisation” in the inter-war period, and the
subsequent increase in trade after WWII, appeared to have had little exogenous impact on wage
inequality. The largest reductions in the volume of trade during the 1930s were witnessed among trade
in manufactures between developed countries, especially within Europe (Kenwood and Lougheed,
1983 p.231). Similarly, the great majority of the large expansion of trade in the immediate post-WWII
period took place between developed countries. Thus the largest impacts of fluctuations in the pattern
of trade after 1914 fell on that portion of trade which was most likely to have consisted of goods
embodying fairly similar proportions of skilled and unskilled labour.
As a result, truly exogenous impacts of changes in the pattern of trade in manufactures before
1970 were small. Instead, these changes in trade, together with movements in wage differentials,
appear to have been jointly driven by three other underlying “domestic” forces. One was the growth of
new skill-intensive industries, associated with advances and diffusion of technology on the one hand,
and increasing final demand for the products of these industries on the other, which was associated
with increases in intra-industry trade. The second was fluctuations in the level of aggregate demand,
which were as much a cause as an effect of “de-globalisation” and “re-globalisation” after 1914. For
instance, the inter-war slump particularly hurt the expansion of intra-industry trade, where calls for
protection from domestic sectors were loudest; similarly, the post-war boom particularly facilitated the
expansion of intra-industry trade. The third was a steady exogenous increase in the relative supply of
skilled labour, which tended to increase the share of manufactures and skill-intensive manufactures in
total exports in all countries.
Thus, in summary, this paper finds only a small impact of globalisation on wage inequality in the
century prior to 1970. However, the fact that a combination of domestic forces had, by 1970, reduced
the relative wages of skilled labour to their lowest ever levels by historical standards was to have large
implications for the post-1970 period. The emergence of a large disparity in the relative price of
skilled labour between the developed countries considered in this paper and the less-developed
countries not considered in this paper must have contributed to the search for ways of utilising cheaper
foreign sources of unskilled labour, which provided the basis for an extension of globalisation after
1970 which was to have substantial impacts on wage inequality.
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NOTES
                                                          
1
  The wage being that of urban unskilled workers, and productivity being GDP per worker-hour.
2
  Trends in wage inequality are of course one component of trends in wage-productivity ratios; the
contribution of this paper lies in disentangling it from trends in all the other non-skilled-wage
elements of wage-productivity ratios.
3
  Although it is not possible to measure skill endowments directly in this period, this is reflected in
the fact that cross-country differences in skill differentials tended to be smaller than they were for
wage-rental ratios, especially between the New and Old Worlds.
4
  The flow of capital from Old World to New during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
may have had a large impact on wage inequality if there were complementarities between capital
and skills, as has been shown in the recent period (e.g. Berman et al., 1994). However, the degree
to which capital and skills were complements rather than substitutes before the current period
remains a complex issue (Goldin and Katz, 1996).
5
  These occupational measures of the relative wages of skilled labour are also frequently used in
the current debate; see, for example, Wood (1994, p. 435-444).
6
  Wood (1994) reports a similar finding for the current period.
7
  It is possible that the extent of return migration among skilled relative to unskilled workers was
in fact an endogenous variable, which responded to changes in the demand for skilled relative to
unskilled workers, and therefore tended to dampen the impact of migration on wage inequality in
receiving countries. See Hatton and Williamson (1995) for an examination of “safety valve” or
“guest worker” theories of immigration in the US before 1914.
8
  This is not true, however, if farm labourers are included among “unskilled” migrants, in which
case the impact of skilled immigration on domestic supply falls relative to the impact of unskilled
immigration in the latter half of the pre-WWI period.
9
  The procedure was also undertaken using values of 0.5 and 2 for the elasticity of substitution. In
the former case, the predicted changes in relative wages were greater than in Table 2.1, so that the
residual changes in relative wages were also greater. In the latter case, the predicted and residual
changes were smaller than in Table 2.1. However, in the majority of cases, only the magnitude (as
opposed to the direction) of the residual varied under these alternative assumptions.
10
  The most likely reason for large increases in the “native” relative supply of skilled manual
workers was the expansion of education: data in Fishlow (1966 p. 430), for example, shows that
total educational expenditures in the US grew from 0.8% of GNP in 1860 to 1.7% in 1900.
11
  Total educational expenditures in the US as a proportion of GNP in fact grew faster between 1880
and 1900 than they did between 1860 and 1880 (Fishlow, 1966 p. 430). The number of patents
granted for inventions - a common barometer of the pace of technological change – shows a
constant rate of increase in the US between 1870 and 1914 (Thomas, 1973 p.173).
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12
  A different conclusion applies when considering the relative wages of non-manual workers in the
UK before 1914. In this case, the impact of migration on relative supply was small, and the
“residual” change in relative wages is negative, implying that the combined effect of forces other
than migration was to reduce relative wages.
13
  For instance, evidence on the increase in trade unionism suggests that the importance of labour-
market institutions grew rapidly in Europe between 1910 and 1920, but a similar trend did not
take place in the US until between 1935 and 1945 (Thomas, 1992; Fortin and Lemieux, 1997).
14
  The exceptions are the cases of skilled manual labour in the US and non-manual labour in
Canada, where the evidence suggests that the decline reflected large increases in the relative
supply of skilled labour.
15
  The exceptions are the cases of skilled manual labour in the US and Canada, where the evidence
suggests an increase in the relative demand for skilled manual labour over this period,  as the fall
in relative wages was smaller than the rise in relative employment
16
  See Appendix 3 for a fuller discussion of the estimating procedure. In estimating shifts in the
“between” component of relative employment, the level of disaggregation of employment data by
industry is important. In this paper, employment is broken down into four “sectors” (agriculture,
mining, manufacturing and construction), and seven “sub-sectors” within manufacturing (food,
beverages and tobacco; textiles and leather; paper and printing; construction materials and
furniture; metals; chemicals; and miscellaneous). Service employment is omitted from the
calculations.
17
  This is confirmed by Appendix 3.2, which shows that employment shifts between broad sectors
were less important determinants of the relative employment of skilled labour (relative to shifts
within  manufacturing) in the UK than in other countries.
18
  In Canada, due to the unavailability of data on employment by industry prior to 1911, it is not
possible to ask whether the changes in the relative demand for skilled labour identified in Section
3.1 reflected inter- or intra-industry employment shifts.
19
  Under the latter assumption, the impact of trade on factor use is calculated as ( )mx zzXZ λ−= ,
where the vector mz contains the average use of skilled and unskilled labour per million dollars of
manufactured imports, and λ equals the share of manufactured imports in total imports.
20
  The effect on relative employment in log points is calculated as 



∆+
∆+
utut
stst
NT
NT
1
1ln ,where ktT∆ is
the change in the factor content of trade of skill group k over the period, and ktN is domestic
employment of skill group k at the period end.
21
  A proper treatment of changes in the trade balance would need to consider the role of capital
flows and the non-traded sector in influencing relative wage outcomes. However, as explained in
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the introduction, it has not been possible to explore these issues within the confines of the present
paper.
22
  The increase in net exports of total manufactures was much larger than the increase in net exports
of skill-intensive manufactures, reflecting the large difference between the FCT calculations
under alternative assumptions regarding the degree to which imports of primary products were
competing.
23
  The picture for the immediate post-WWII years in Denmark is slightly different; during the
1950s, a particularly large increase in the between-industry component of relative employment
coincided with a particularly large increase in net exports of manufactures as a proportion of
GDP, and a reversal of the long-run decline in relative wages, suggesting that trade was an
important exogenous influence on relative wages.
24
  The semi-skilled (termed “operatives” in the US labour statistics) were an increasingly important
occupational class of manual workers after 1914, mainly - although not totally - because of the
expansion of new manufacturing industries in which they were employed in relatively high
proportions. The effect of the increase in the demand for semi-skilled workers on the wage
differential between skilled and unskilled manual workers depends on the extent to which either
skilled or unskilled manual workers were relative complements or substitutes.
25
  Goldin and Katz (1997) suggest that the acceleration of educational expansion in the US and
Canada between 1910 and 1940 led to a large gap in attainments relative to the UK and other
European countries, which had only been partially eroded by the mid-1950s. The same authors
also argue that the increase in relative demand in the US between 1910 and 1940 not only
reflected the growth of new skill-intensive industries, but also the emergence of certain new
technologies, such as electrification and continuous or batch processes of production (Goldin and
Katz, 1996).
26
  Average unemployment rates between 1922 and 1929 were 3.2% in Canada, 3.8% in the US, and
5.5% in Australia, compared with 8.0% in the UK, 9.9% in Germany, and 11.4% in Sweden
(Mitchell, 1992 p. 159; 1993 p.108).
27
  Fortin and Lemieux (1997) also suggest that changing institutional influences may have been
important in explaining the fall in relative wages in the US during this period.
28
  Postan (1967, p.319) documents that in the UK, 45% of youths entering employment at the end of
the 1950s were trained for skilled jobs, compared with less than 20% before WWII. Similar
changes also took place in France and Germany.
29
  Other authors have noted how the expansion of new industries and processes of production during
WWI particularly hurt British skilled manual workers, who saw the demand for their services fall
relative to the “semi-skilled” (Pollard, 1992 p.34,41). It has also been noted that the 1910-20
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decade saw a large change in labour-market institutions which was biased toward the fortunes of
the unskilled (Phelps Brown, 1977 p. 77).
30
  In the UK, for example, trade openness (the ratio of the sum of total exports and imports to GDP)
varied from 44% in 1870, to 48% in 1913, 25% in 1938 and 32% in 1960.
31
  Crafts and Thomas (1986) for example, have argued that in the UK, comparative advantage
within manufacturing lay in less skill-intensive products, in contrast to the US and Germany
where comparative advantage lay in more skill-intensive products.
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